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Abstract 
This article discusses discourses on differentiated integration (DI) in Finland both from the 
quantitative and qualitative perspectives. It illustrates how salient DI has been in Finland between 
2004 and 2019 and how government and opposition parties have approached DI, with special focus 
on the Prüm Convention and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in defence. It also examines 
approaches towards polity differentiation, i.e., the idea of multi-speed or multi-end Europe, as well as 
discourses on DI mechanisms, namely enhanced cooperation and opt-outs. The article concludes that 
the Finnish approach towards DI is pragmatic and generally positive, as the country has joined almost 
all instances of enhanced cooperation, unlike its Nordic neighbours Denmark and Sweden. This may 
be due to the lack of politicisation of DI in Finland, which has also allowed the country to join those 
instances. 
Keywords: differentiated integration, European Union, Finland, Permanent Structured Cooperation, 
Prüm Convention 
Introduction 
Not much is known about how European Union (EU) Member State governments view 
differentiated integration, and this article aims to fill this gap for one EU Member 
State: Finland. It investigates the salience of differentiated integration (DI) in Finnish 
government discourses between 2004 and 2019. It also probes into the position of 
Finnish governments on the issue of DI in selected peak-salience years (2006–2008, 
2012–2014, 2017–2020). The assumption is that the more a government talks about 
DI, the more relevant it is. While key word counts in government programmes and PM 
speeches show the salience of DI at specific moments in time, an analysis of 
parliamentary debates allows us to identify trends over time and situational peaks.  
Finland does not have any opt-outs from EU policies, but it participates in most 
instances of enhanced cooperation. In general, Finnish politicians have emphasised 
that the optimal solution would be to have all EU Member States on board – but 
differentiated integration can be an option in order to move forward in certain fields. 
 
1 The research leading to this report was conducted within the InDivEU project. The project has received funding 
from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 




Finland has wanted to remain in core Europe and participate in all significant 
integration projects. Since 2004, participation in the Prüm Convention and Permanent 
Structured Cooperation (PESCO) seem to be the only DI instances that some 
politicians have opposed. These two instances of policy differentiation are also 
discussed specifically in this article, since those were the ones that spurred some 
political controversy. Usually, Finland is involved in new EU policy initiatives as a 
matter of course. In the case of PESCO, the Finnish government even took some credit 
for the launch of cooperation. This is remarkable for a non-NATO country which was 
initially wary of some aspects of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (see 
e.g. Devine 2011; Duke 2018). 
In the Finnish case it is also interesting that its Nordic neighbours, Sweden and 
Denmark, have been much more reluctant to join all EU policies. Neither Sweden nor 
Denmark is part of the eurozone, Denmark has opt-outs from key integration fields 
and has not joined PESCO or the Prüm Convention, of which Sweden only became a 
member in 2013. Finland therefore stands out as the Nordic country that is most 
interested in participating in voluntary EU policy frameworks. The sections that follow 
delve deeper into the Finnish approach on differentiated integration and potential 
explanations for this. The questions the article seeks to answer include to what extent 
and how have Finnish politicians discussed differentiated integration, and what are the 
potential explanatory factors behind the positive approach? 
Theory and methods 
The results are based on an analysis of various government documents with the 
framework outlined in the introduction to this special issue (Telle, Brunazzo & Doidge 
2021). The material analysed includes government programmes, Prime Ministerial 
speeches, Prime Ministerial European Council statements2 and parliamentary debates. 
They were analysed in this order. The salience of DI models, DI mechanisms and DI 
instances was assessed by counting key words in the above-mentioned documents. In 
some cases, key words were counted from 1994 onwards (Finland joined the European 
Union in 1995). The material included in the analysis is presented in Table 1. 
Table 1 Overview of the documents analysed 
 Category of document Time period Details 
1 Government programmes  2004-2020 2007, 2010, 2011, 2014, 2015, 2019 x 2 
(same programme with a different PM) 
2 First speeches  
and parliamentary debate 
  
2004-2020 The first speech after the election of each 
PM in parliament and the subsequent 
debates (years same as above).  
3 European Council 
presidency speeches 
and parliamentary debates 
a. in Finnish Parliament 
2004-2020 21.6.2006 (Finnish Parliament)  
5.7.2006 (European Parliament 
26.6.2019 (Finnish Parliament) 
17.7.2019 (European Parliament) 
 
2 The latest statement related to DI was made on 22 November 2017 on current EU matters, including PESCO 
(Finnish Parliament, 2017). Another statement was made in May 2017 about the Commission’s Future of Europe 
scenarios, and this was the parliamentary debate with the strongest focus on DI over the period covered. It seems 
that the Prime Minister provides such statements only on very important topics. The statements focused on 
Ukraine in 2014, on economic matters discussed at a summit in 2011, on the European stability package in 2010, 
on the results of the inter-governmental conference (Lisbon) in 2007, on current EU matters after a summit in 
Lahti in 2006, on the Northern Dimension in 2005 and on the summit agreeing on the Constitutional Treaty in 
2004.  
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b. in European 
Parliament 
4 Future of Europe speeches  
and parliamentary debates 
a. in European 
Parliament 
b. for citizen 
consultations  
2017-2020 - PM speech in the European Parliament 
on the ‘Future of Europe’ on 31 Jan 2019 
- PM speech on the citizen consultation on 
the ‘Future of Europe’ on 31 Aug 2018 
5 Prime Minister European 
Council Statements  
2004-2020 All post-Council statements by PMs in the 
Finnish Parliament: 2004, 2005, 2006, 
2007, 2010, 2011, 2014, 2017 x 2 
6 Parliamentary debates 2006-2008 
2012-2014 
2017-2020 
Documents with one of the following key 
words: multi-speed Europe, coalition of 
the willing, core Europe, à la carte, 
enhanced cooperation, opt-out 
7 Government EU Policy 
Reports and EU Influence 
Strategies 
2004-2020 EU Policy Reports 2009 and 2013, EU 
Influence Strategies 2016, 2017 and 2018 
Since Finland has two official languages, all the key words were searched in the 
repository of the Finnish Parliament with both Finnish and Swedish equivalents. The 
keywords were searched with the stem of the word, as both languages may have small 
variations at the end of the word depending on the conjugation of the word. The main 
problem encountered in the search was that the Finnish and Swedish equivalents are 
rarely used in political debates, perhaps due to their technicality. Sometimes, only one 
part of the key word was used in the search, such as ‘differentiated,’ which might have 
been used in connection with a word other than ‘integration.’ For some key phrases, 
both the acronym and the longer version were searched. 
The results regarding the number of key words in government documents and 
parliamentary debates were verified through a close reading and holistic grading of the 
respective government programmes and speeches.3 The following sections summarise 
the results of the analysis.   
Polity differentiation: Multi-speed Europe and multi-end Europe 
The use of conceptual key words in parliamentary debates is visible in Figure 1. We can 
observe that conceptual key words related to DI models have been practically non-
existent in parliamentary debates. The low salience of DI is also reflected in the fact 
that the concepts do not have established translations and are not part of everyday 
political debate, even though politicians might de facto discuss differentiated 
integration. The figure below illustrates that salience has been low throughout the 
period from 1994 onwards. Finland has usually considered it important to join 
instances of enhanced cooperation, even though the country has emphasised that unity 
is always the preferred option, and such instances must remain open to all willing 
Member States in all stages of their development. 
 
3 Each document (n=28) was carefully read and scored between 0 (no reference to DI) and 2 (direct reference to 




Figure 1 The salience of conceptual key words in parliamentary debates 
 
Over the entire period, ‘multi-speed Europe’ and ‘core Europe’ were the most 
frequently recurring key phrases, covering more than two thirds of all the conceptual 
key words. A breakdown of the keywords used in peak-salience years (2000, 2003, 
2017) illustrates that there was variation. In 2017, most DI references referred to ‘core 
Europe’ and ‘multi-speed Europe’. However, in 2000 and 2003 not many references 
to ‘core Europe’ were made while most key words referred to ‘multi-speed Europe’. 
Interestingly, ‘differentiated integration’ as such was not mentioned in the 2017 or 
2000 debates, but in 2003 there was one reference.  
We can see that 2017 was the absolute peak year, with multi-speed Europe coming up 
in several debates. However, most references were made in a single debate held on 31 
May 2017 after the Prime Minister’s announcement on EU policy as a result of the 
Commission’s White Paper on the Future of Europe. Still, the fact that multi-speed 
Europe was referred to only fourteen times during the peak year suggests that concepts 
related to DI are very rarely discussed in the Finnish Parliament.  
The use of DI key words was not very frequent in post-Council statements by Prime 
Ministers either. Core (ydin) Europe was only used in 2010 and multi-speed 
(eritahtinen) Europe appeared in both the statements made in 2017. Overall, 
differentiated integration does not seem to be a key issue as such. Finland has been 
eager to join almost all instances of enhanced cooperation and DI has not caused 
significant debate. 
While the salience of polity differentiation was low, the quantitative analysis regarding 
DI models shows that Finnish politicians have a rather positive or neutral approach to 
multi-speed Europe and coalitions of the willing, in which Finland has usually 
participated (Figures 2 and 3 below). The government is slightly more positive than 
the opposition, with the opposition mainly making neutral statements with regard to 
multi-speed Europe. When it comes to multi-end Europe, the situation is more divided, 
since there is a slightly higher number of negative statements than positive ones. In 
2017, the negative statements by the opposition usually dealt with PESCO, which the 
opposition did not believe would take Finland into the core of Europe. Positive 
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negative statements considered that there is a core Europe making decisions which 
Finland has little chance of influencing. Being in the core appeared positive and 
remaining outside was negative.  
Figure 2 Position on multi-speed Europe (multi-speed + coalition of the willing) 
(n = 27) Negative Neutral Positive 
Government 3 3 6 
Opposition 3 9 3 
2006-2008 2 0 0 
2012-2014 2 2 0 
2017-2020 2 10 9 
 
Figure 3 Position on multi-end Europe (core Europe + à la carte) 
(n = 22) Negative Neutral Positive 
Government 3 2 2 
Opposition 6 3 6 
2006-2008 1 1 2 
2012-2014 1 0 0 
A few examples of these instances are illustrated here. For example, on 2 May 2012, 
there was a debate on how the Lisbon Treaty had impacted the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy. The parliament’s Committee for Foreign Affairs had a critical view of 
the EU’s external action in its report issued to the parliament. MP Miapetra Kumpula-
Natri, chair of the Grand Committee dealing with EU affairs, considered that the Union 
was operating normally, although the financial crisis dominated the media. She also 
deemed it important to have a clear position on a multi-speed Europe: 
“But these decisions on the measures that are proposed are also important to 
take into account in their entirety because there will be multi-speed 
development in different sectors, and what is Finland’s position in this new 
kind of Europe?” (MP Miapetra Kumpula-Natri (SDP), 2 May 2012). 
On 28 April 2017, two Social Democratic MPs took up DI in a debate on a government 
proposal on the European Small Claims procedure and the European Order for 
Payment procedure. They called for a general debate on the Future of Europe already 
before the scheduled debate on 31 May, in the light of the five scenarios of the 
Commission White Paper. They wanted to know if Finland wanted to be in the core of 
Europe and if there could be multi-speed integration: 
“In addition, what I have thought of a lot is this comprehensive debate, whether 
we enter all the cores and how deeply and in which fields and whether there 
can be multi-speed development and so on” (MP Pia Viitanen (SDP), 
28.4.2017). 
On 31 May 2017, the Prime Minister stated that, “If necessary, multi-speed 
advancement in the Union is also possible.” (Prime Minister Juha Sipilä (Centre), 
31.5.2017). Whereas the government spoke mainly through the Prime Minister (the 




took the opportunity to present their views on differentiated integration in their group 
presentations. They insisted on Finnish influence and were worried that some 
countries would steer integration too heavily. For example, a Social Democratic MP 
reminded that “if integration shifts towards multi-speed Europe, Finland will have 
to aim to have influence at all the tables” (MP Jutta Urpilainen (SDP), 31.5.2017). 
Finally, in a debate on current EU issues announced by the Prime Minister on 22 
November 2017, a few opposition politicians took the opportunity to criticise the 
unclear approach to DI and the lack of leadership in Finnish EU policy: 
“You, Prime Minister, simultaneously talked about unity and gave your support 
for multi-speed development” (MP Tytti Tuppurainen (SDP), 22.11.2017). 
Overall, both government and opposition politicians approached both multi-speed 
Europe and multi-end Europe positively, even though the latter word was not explicitly 
used. Instead, some politicians emphasised that it is important that Finland enters all 
cores of Europe. In the next section, two examples of policy differentiation are 
discussed: the Prüm Convention and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in 
defence.  
Policy differentiation: Prüm Convention and PESCO 
The Prüm Convention and PESCO are the two differentiated EU policies that were 
discussed the most in the analysed material. As mentioned above, Finland joined both 
policies and took even partial credit for the launch of PESCO. The Prüm Convention is 
a so-called inter se agreement, which EU Member States concluded outside the 
framework of the European Union. PESCO, in turn, is an instance of enhanced 
cooperation made possible by the Lisbon Treaty among willing Member States within 
the framework of the European Union (see also Telle, Brunazzo & Doidge 2021). 
Figure 4 shows that debates about differentiated inter se agreements peaked in 2012, 
when there was a total of 148 references to the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
in Finnish parliamentary debates. This is due to the financial crisis and the 
establishment of the ESM in late 2012. However, the ESM was not discussed within 
the context of differentiated integration, while the Prüm Convention is a more 
interesting case for the purposes of this article focusing on DI. The Prüm Convention, 
indeed, aroused quite an active debate during its peak year 2006, when the Finnish 
government issued its proposal to join the Convention. The Prüm Convention also 
came up relatively often in the years immediately following the Finnish accession to 
the Convention in 2007, but no references were made after 2016.  
The Prüm Convention peak was also visible in the 2006 presidency speech in the 
Finnish Parliament, which mentioned the Prüm Convention eight times, as the 
government parties and even the largest opposition party expressed support for 
participating in the Convention, which Finland had yet to join. The government issued 
a proposal to join the Prüm Convention in March 2006, with the opposition Greens 
and the Left Alliance criticising the proposal (and eventually voting against it in 
February 2007). Only seven EU Member States were involved in establishing the Prüm 
Convention, and these two opposition parties criticised Finland for joining an already 
agreed arrangement among a few countries outside the EU structures. 
Heinikoski, ANZJES 13(3) 
 
30 
Figure 4 The salience of instances of inter se agreements in parliamentary debates 
 
There was a debate on 8 November 2006 on the government proposal on the approval 
of the Prüm Convention. Justice Minister Leena Luhtanen (Social Democratic Party) 
stated that the Prüm Convention had not been prepared in accordance with the Treaty 
provisions on enhanced cooperation but intergovernmentally, which was contrary to 
the general objectives of Finnish EU policy. However, she considered that this 
derogation from the Finnish line of promoting EU-level preparation was justified due 
to the benefits received from participation: 
“A few words on the relation of the Prüm Convention to the general objectives 
in Finnish EU policy. We declared in our statement [by the Ministry of Justice] 
that the Prüm Convention has not been prepared in accordance with the 
provisions in the EU Treaties concerning enhanced cooperation but 
intergovernmentally, and this is where this preparation diverts from the 
general principles of Finnish EU policy. Because of this, the Ministerial 
Committee on EU Affairs, among others, has discussed and processed this issue 
several times, but has considered that the benefit received from joining the 
Convention in terms of promoting international cooperation by law 
enforcement authorities is greater than the possible damage caused by activities 
that are contrary to the principle assumed in Finnish EU policy” (Justice 
Minister Leena Luhtanen (SDP), 8.11.2006). 
In the same debate, the Minister of the Interior from the same party also defended 
Finnish participation and considered that participating in the Prüm Convention took 
Finland into the core of internal security in the EU: “Finland reacting so fast has 
brought us among the core and leading countries in internal security” (Interior 
Minister Kari Rajamäki (SDP), 8.11.2006). 
As has already been mentioned, the Left Alliance and the Greens voted against 
Finland’s participation in the Prüm Convention, but this was rarely done with 
reference to DI. However, a Left MP did raise during the debate that joining the Prüm 
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“If one develops more models resembling the Prüm Convention, when one 
makes intergovernmental agreements, I claim that this contributes to whittling 
away at the European Union. It can be that on some issues certain countries can 
launch enhanced cooperation, if not everyone is willing, but it must not be 
the main rule. The main rule should be strengthening communality” (MP Outi 
Ojala (Left), 21.6.2006). 
When looking at instances of enhanced cooperation, in turn, the pattern becomes very 
clear (Figure 5). On the one hand, instances of enhanced cooperation show very low 
salience. On the other hand, more than three quarters of the references are related to 
PESCO, a project for which Finnish politicians took partial credit and almost all parties 
fully supported. PESCO was established in December 2017, which was also the peak 
year for references to it (28 of 39 references).  
PESCO was referred to in three consecutive sentences in the 2019 government 
programmes and was cited as “a key project for the defence dimension of the EU.” The 
programme declared that “Finland will contribute actively to the development of 
defence cooperation within the EU.” This was in line with the previous government’s 
position on PESCO and European defence cooperation. 
Although launched only in 2017, PESCO had already been raised in Finnish 
parliamentary debates in 2012, when the approach was positive. However, the debate 
became more vivid in 2016, when the EU Council and European Council endorsed the 
launch of PESCO (Council of the European Union, 2016; European Council, 2017). In 
the debate on the White Paper on Defence Policy in March 2017, an MP from the 
Greens deemed it positive that Finland was involved in the European core: “I was also 
pleased to hear the Prime Minister tell how strongly Finland has committed to 
developing a common defence policy of the EU. It is important that we are 
strongly involved in all these cores” (MP Johanna Karimäki (Greens), 8.3.2017). 
Figure 5 The salience of instances of enhanced cooperation in parliamentary debates 
 
What was similar in the Prüm and PESCO cases is that joining both instances were 
opposed by the Left Alliance in the Finnish Parliament. The Green Party also objected 

























































































Unitary patent Matrimonial property regimes








Heinikoski, ANZJES 13(3) 
 
32 
incumbent government, which includes both parties, affirms a positive stance on 
PESCO in its government programme. 
The parliamentary debate on PESCO was held on 22 November 2017 in conjunction 
with the Prime Minister’s announcement on current EU issues. The Prime Minister 
again outlined the Finnish position on DI, which he claimed had become the EU’s 
common line: 
“We permit multi-speed development when certain preconditions are 
fulfilled. Finland is currently involved in all the models of multi-speed 
development. Decisions on participation are always made case-specifically, 
starting from the common interest of both Finland and the Union” (Prime 
Minister Juha Sipilä (Centre), 22.11.2017). 
In the same parliamentary debate, the Prime Minister also stated that Finland had 
been among the first countries to announce its participation in PESCO, had 
contributed to the preparation with seven other countries, and had managed to pass 
the initiative on mentioning the mutual assistance clause in the PESCO notification. 
Indeed, PESCO was one of the instances of enhanced cooperation that Finland actively 
promoted together with France (France & Finland, 2016). One of the recitals of the 
PESCO notification reads as “Recalling the obligation under Article 42(7) TEU of 
mutual aid and assistance”, which links PESCO with the obligation to provide military 
aid, at least in the view of the leading Finnish politicians of the time. This was 
considered positive as Finland is not a NATO member, and PESCO appeared to provide 
the country with some sort of security guarantee. However, at least the European 
Parliament has considered PESCO to also enhance EU–NATO cooperation (European 
Parliament, 2018), which may undermine the pursuit for European autonomy in 
defence.  
Defence is often considered one of the so-called “core state powers” (Genschel & 
Jachtenfuchs, 2018), and it is interesting that militarily non-allied Finland has pursued 
integration in this field. One reason may be the positive approach of Finnish citizens: 
more than 50 % of Finns have been found to support deeper defence cooperation 
within the EU (Härkönen, 2019). A much more heated debate on PESCO was held in 
the similarly militarily non-allied Sweden (see e.g. Heinikoski 2020), whilst Denmark 
decided not to join PESCO. It appears that the defence aspect of European integration 
is a more sensitive issue in the Nordic neighbours of Finland, whilst Finnish politicians 
whole-heartedly support deeper defence cooperation. The next section, in turn, 
discusses how enhanced cooperation in general appeared in the Finnish material.  
Mechanisms of differentiation: opt-outs and enhanced 
cooperation 
‘Enhanced cooperation’ or ‘opt-out’ were mentioned only 100 times in parliamentary 
debates during the period 2000 to 2019. The breakdown into these two DI mechanisms 
clearly shows that the vast majority of references dealt with enhanced cooperation; 
there were only 11 references to opt-outs in Finnish parliamentary debates. Again, we 
need to remember that there is no established translation in Finnish for opt-out, which 
is why the English term ‘opt-out’ was used in the search. Other formulations of the 
concept of opt-out in Finnish are too complex to yield any results in the search in 




and British decisions to remain outside of certain EU policies. Enhanced cooperation 
was not much discussed either, but there were some references.4 In particular, there 
was a peak in the debate on enhanced cooperation in 2003 (see Figure 6). This was 
related to the Convention on the Future of Europe, which prepared the proposed EU 
Constitution that entailed enhanced cooperation within the field of defence.  
Figure 6 The salience of DI mechanisms in parliamentary debates 
 
Regarding the EU policy fields for which some EU Member States have opt-outs, we 
can observe in Figure 7 that these policy fields have been fairly often discussed over the 
16-year period. However, since Finland has not opted out from any policy field, the 
discussions regarding these instances did not relate to opt-outs (and even less so to the 
possibility of Finland opting out). Because only 11 references to opt-outs were made 
during the period, the opt-outs by the United Kingdom (UK) and Ireland were also 
rarely referred to. 
Figure 7 Salience of opt-out policy fields 
 
 
4 While enhanced cooperation is a specific term in EU jargon, the Finnish and Swedish translations “tiiviimpi 
yhteistyö/fördjupat samarbete” are used in many other contexts and do not always refer to enhanced cooperation 
in the EU, but instead to closer cooperation between any actors. Therefore, it was necessary to make sure that the 
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Opt-outs and enhanced cooperation were also rarely discussed in government 
documents. In the first speech by the PM in the European Parliament during the 
Finnish Council presidency in 2006, there was one reference to opt-outs. The 2006 
presidency speech in the Finnish Parliament, in turn, outlined that enhanced 
cooperation between certain groups of countries may be possible and necessary, but 
emphasised that the Union should remain as united as possible and that the Member 
States should be equal.  
In terms of mechanisms of differentiation, the 2013 government report on EU policy 
was perhaps the most interesting one, as it included a separate 2-page section entitled 
“United Union,” which dealt with DI. It described three forms of DI with examples: 1) 
sector-specific cooperation with a smaller group of Member States (euro and 
Schengen), 2) opt-out models (Justice and Home Affairs) and 3) enhanced cooperation 
and Permanent Structured Cooperation (Matrimony, the Patent and the Financial 
Transaction Tax). However, the approach to DI seems to have been consistent: unity 
is preferred, but DI arrangements open to all Member States may be used if necessary.  
Figures 8 and 9 show that enhanced cooperation was considered more positively by 
the government, which also referred to opt-outs in a neutral or positive manner. Some 
opposition politicians considered opt-outs negative in advancing legislative processes. 
Both mechanisms aroused little debate during the periods analysed. In 2006–2008, 
enhanced cooperation was discussed with regard to the Prüm Convention, and since 
2017 there has been some debate on PESCO and the Future of Europe.  
Figure 8 Position on enhanced co-operation 
(n = 13) Negative Neutral Positive 
Government (n=8) 1 2 5 
Opposition (n = 5) 4 1 0 
2006-2008 2 2 1 
2012-2014 2 0 2 
2017-2020 1 1 2 
Figure 9 Position on "opt-outs" 
(n = 6) Negative Neutral Positive 
Government (n = 3) 0 1 2 
Opposition (n = 3) 2 1 0 
2006-2008 0 2 0 
2012-2014 0 0 1 
2017-2020 2 0 1 
Finland held the Council presidency during the second half of 2006, and Prime 
Minister Matti Vanhanen (Centre) sometimes made principled statements on DI. For 
example, in the debate on 21 June 2006 on the upcoming Council presidency, 
Vanhanen defined the line that characterised the Finnish approach to DI throughout 
the period: DI is possible, but all Member States must remain equal. There was also 
some debate over an interview with former Commission President Jacques Delors in 
the Finnish Journal of Foreign Affairs (Ulkopolitiikka), which the Finnish Prime 
Minister and many MPs referred to. Delors had stated that the enlarged Union should 




were interested in all fields, “and that is how it should be.” PM Vanhanen recalled that 
all Member States had joined the Rapid Reaction Force (EU Battlegroups), but in fact 
Malta and Denmark remained outside. We can observe that the Prime Minister had a 
slightly negative approach to enhanced cooperation as he wanted all Member States to 
be involved: 
“Enhanced cooperation among certain groups of countries is of course 
possible, and it may sometimes even be necessary. […] Perhaps the core message 
in the article on former Commission President Delors related to the assessment 
that the Union should differentiate in the future. With this enhanced 
cooperation, it is possible, but I have not heard a single proposal on the fields 
where this could take place, and I have not heard that there could be fields in 
which not everyone was interested” (Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen (Centre), 
21.6.2006). 
On 10 April 2008, Prime Minister Vanhanen presented the government proposal on 
the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. He did not take a stance on DI, but simply 
mentioned that the Treaty included provisions on enhanced cooperation: “Compared 
to the Constitutional Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty includes strengthened provisions on 
the emergency brake concerning Justice and Home Affairs and on enhanced 
cooperation, but these specifications do not change the basic solutions” (Prime 
Minister Matti Vanhanen (Centre), 10.4.2008). 
Opt-outs were not discussed much in the documents, but two exceptions included the 
effect of the opt-outs on the Lisbon Treaty as well as the Working Time Directive. A 
question by MP Krista Kiuru was presented to Migration and Europe Minister Thors 
on the Irish and British opt-outs in the Lisbon Treaty. MP Kiuru did not take a stance 
on DI but wanted to know what the effects of the Lisbon Treaty were, including 
Ireland’s and the UK’s opt-outs (MP Krista Kiuru (SDP), 19.4.2008). 
Migration and Europe Minister Astrid Thors answered the MP’s question on Ireland 
and the UK’s opt-outs, emphasising that they did not jeopardise what was agreed in 
common: “You [MP Kiuru] also presented a very difficult question on the impact of 
Ireland and the UK’s opt-outs. They can have an impact in the sense that they 
postpone the time when these issues that are part of Justice and Home Affairs come 
under the supervision of the Courts of Justice of the European Communities” 
(Migration and Europe Minister Astrid Thors (SFP), 10.4.2008). 
Interestingly, there was also one event in which a member of a government party 
proposed that Finland should have an opt-out related to the implementation of the 
Working Time Directive. An MP from the Blue Reform party regarded it as essential 
for healthcare in a debate on 3 October 2018 on the government proposal for the 
Working Time Act:  
“In order to be able to ensure certain special health care services in the future, 
Finland should also permit the use of a so-called limited opt-out. It means that 
one could deviate from the maximum working times in the Working Time 
Directive with an agreement between the employer and employee with the 
preconditions mentioned in the directive” (MP Lea Mäkipää (Blue Reform), 
3.10.2018). 
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Another case in which opt-outs were discussed with regard to the Working Time 
Directive was in March 2019, this time from a negative perspective from the 
opposition’s side, claiming opt-outs make it difficult to pass legislation: 
“I must say that while it was in the European Parliament this Working Time 
Directive was in a sort of permanent stalemate. This means that one stated in 
different ways that it did not move forward because Member States had so many 
so-called opt-outs which related to this Working Time Directive. For 
example, the UK systematically opted out from the entire Union, but 
already at the time it stated on these working time provisions that they do not 
apply to it” (MP Sari Essayah (Christian Democrats), 7.3.2019). 
As we have seen, DI is not much discussed in Finland, but there are some interesting 
references to polity differentiation, policy differentiation and mechanism of 
differentiation. Summary of results, potential explanatory factors and future research 
is discussed in the final section below. 
Discussion and conclusion 
Overall, DI was not a very salient topic in Finland, but all the governments usually at 
some point brought up the Finnish stance of supporting uniform integration, where DI 
may be used if necessary and if it is open to all the Member States. It was usually the 
Prime Minister who discussed DI on the government’s side, and the opposition 
included certain active politicians who wanted to express their stance on a specific DI 
instance. Opposition politicians generally called for a clear Finnish stance on the future 
of Europe and DI. At the same time, they expressed certain doubts about whether 
Finland was in the core of Europe and able to influence the development of the EU. 
There were fears that if DI became more common it would mean that large Member 
States would have even more power, whereas Finland could lose influence in these 
fields. Furthermore, opposition politicians called for open debates about the future of 
the EU. The Finns Party warned of a more federalist EU and the Christian Democrats 
were concerned about Finland’s dwindling powers in the EU. At the other end of the 
spectrum, the Social Democrats and the Greens pursued more active EU debates and 
advocated more active participation. 
DI debates usually dealt with specific DI instances, and the only more principled 
debate on DI was held on 31 May 2017, following the Prime Minister’s announcement 
on EU policy reflecting the Commission’s White Paper on the Future of Europe 
published that spring. It seems that the Finnish approach was very pragmatic and 
reflects the overall EU policy of Finland, which has traditionally not been very 
politicised. We could observe some attempts at politicisation of certain DI instances 
from opposition parties such as the Finns and Christian Democrats, but generally DI 
as such did not arouse much debate. This pragmatic and positive approach towards DI 
is also visible in the Finnish policy: Finland has joined most instances even more 
eagerly than its Nordic neighbours. These are of course tendencies that mutually 
strengthen each other: non-politicisation allows Finland to join enhanced cooperation 
and being involved in DI reinforces the positive and pragmatic approach. Both 
examples of DI discussed in this article, namely the Prüm Convention and PESCO, 
relate to the field of security, which probably explains the more eager approach of 
Finland compared to Denmark and Sweden: a non-NATO country with a history of war 




While the domestic factors potentially explain the lack of salience of DI, the peak years 
can be explained by European politics, as DI was discussed mostly when specific DI 
instances, such as the Prüm Convention or PESCO, were being prepared. Furthermore, 
the Commission’s “White paper on the future of Europe: Five scenarios” spurred some 
debate also in the Finnish Parliament. 
The non-politicisation may also explain the positive Finnish position towards DI, since 
it is not approached from an identity-related perspective, but DI is considered 
functional whenever not all parties want to join certain instances. The issue is mostly 
looked at from the Finnish perspective, as Finland is considered to gain by 
participating in “all cores”. Even though some parties opposed certain instances of DI, 
there seems to exist a reasonable consensus that Finland should attempt to be in the 
core of Europe rather than being marginalised. Finland is a fairly recent Member State 
located on the Northern periphery, and EU membership is considered vital for the 
country’s economic and security interests, which also makes the country more positive 
towards the Prüm Convention and PESCO. 
In the future, it will be interesting to analyse whether DI becomes more politicised, as 
other EU debates have done in Finland. It would also be fruitful to compare the 
differences in the approaches of Nordic EU countries, namely Denmark, which joined 
the Union in 1973, and Finland and Sweden, which both joined the EU in 1995. All 
three countries have adopted different policies towards DI; Denmark has opt-out/opt-
in options, e.g. in. Justice and Home Affairs, Sweden has been more reserved towards 
joining DI instances and Finland has joined almost all instances. As illustrated in this 
article, one relevant aspect may be the level of politicisation of EU affairs. 
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